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This critique and its proposals focus upon the concept of mental disease'
in insanity tests in contemporary American criminal law and specifically
upon those tests relating to the culpability of the accused 2 rather than
to his capacity to stand trial or to face execution. 3 Although there are,
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1 "Mental disease" is often interchanged with such synonymous variants as "disease of
the mind," "mental illness," "mental disorder," and "unsound mind." See, e.g., Carter v.
United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("Mental 'disease' means mental illness.");
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ("mental disease" and "mental
disorder" used in a way clearly implying their equivalence).
This article does not deal with the special problems of organic mental disease-those
which are manifested in tissue change or abnormality-but deals rather with those general
abnormalities classified as "behavioral." A thorough analysis of the legal effect of organic
defects and a substantial bibliography, mostly of medical sources, may be found in Fox,
Physical Disorder, Consciousness, and Criminal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. Rav. 645 (1963).
Nor does this article deal with the other elements of the criminal law insanity tests-
"knowing the nature and quality of the act," "knowing the act is wrong," "irresistible
impulse," or "incapacity to conform to law or to appreciate the criminality of the act."
2 In addition to the M'Naghten, Durham, and Model Penal Code tests, set out in
notes 7, 9, and 10 infra, respectively, current criminal law insanity tests include the follow-
ing: (1) "The jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing the prohibited act
the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law he is alleged to have violated."
United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961). (2) "[W]hether there is such a
mental disease as dipsomania, and whether defendant had that disease, and whether the
killing of [the victim] ... was the product of such disease, were questions of fact for the
jury." State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 407-08 (1869). See also State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 398
(1871). (3) The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953 Report, CraD. No.
8932, at 116, 276 (1953), recommended abrogating M'Naghten and leaving "the jury to de-
termine whether at the time of the act the accused was suffering from disease of the mind
(or mental deficiency) to such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible."
3 The standard test as to ability to stand trial relates to the capacity of the accused to
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense. See, e.g., MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.04 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961). The special problems of inter-
vening insanity prior to execution are discussed in Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of the
Insanity Plea-Clues to the Problems of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity in the
Death Cell, 73 YALE L.J. 425 (1964).
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in this area, crucial problems of a logical or conceptual kind amenable
to philosophical analysis, the literature is almost entirely the work of
jurists, psychiatrists, and psychologists.4 This article attempts to fill that
gap with a unified, concrete discussion in which legal, psychiatric,
and philosophical analyses are intertwined.
The article consists of three major parts. The first will explore
generally the need for proper definition and analysis of the concept of
mental disease in criminal law insanity tests and will survey the rele-
vant current literature to show that there is no medically or scientific-
ally recognized concept of mental disease. The second part presents
a conceptual analysis of the logical status and role of mental disease
in the context of medicine and law. The final part of the discussion
argues that there is a legitimate and necessary role for the notion
"mental disease" as an element of a sound criminal law test for in-
sanity, and offers concrete proposals for interpreting "mental disease"
so that it can properly and clearly play this role. The analysis provides
justification for maximal freedom for expert testimony in court and
tends to encourage the use of this freedom; the analysis also results
in disengaging legal doctrine from commitment to specific diagnoses,
theories, doctrines, concepts, or other technical tenets peculiar to the
state of psychiatry or psychology at a particular time.
I. THE UNSATISFIED NEED FOR A DEFINrrION OF MENTAL DISEASE
The criminal law in its concern for the responsibility of the actor has
traditionally insisted on the existence of a "guilty mind"-mens rea-
in order to hold an actor criminally responsible for his acts. Thus,
insanity has emerged as a criminal law defense.5 Without paraphrasing
the language of any of the various insanity tests, I think it can be
4 See generally GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY (1962); GUTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSY-
CHIATRY AND THE LAW (1952); RocHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND (1958); RUBIN, PSYCHIATRy AND
CRIMINAL LAw (1965). There have been numerous recent evaluations of the various tests,
especially stimulated, it seems, by the Durham opinion in 1954. See, e.g., Kuh, The
Insanity Defense-An Effort To Combine Law and Reason, 110 U. PA. L. Rav. 771 (1962);
Reid, Criminal Insanity and Psychiatric Evidence: The Challenge of Blocker, 8 How.
L.J. 1 (1962). Philosophical studies have been generally devoted to the various insanity
tests themselves, not to the underlying problems raised by their terminology. See, e.g.,
Raab, A Moralist Looks at the Durham and M'Naghten Rules, 46 MINN. L. REv. 327
(1961). One article focuses on the concept of "mental disease" from the viewpoint of
the drafter of legislation. See Swartz, "Mental Disease": The Groundwork for Legal
Analysis and Legislative Action, 111 U. PA. L. Rav. 389 (1963).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 773-76 (3d Cir. 1961); BICS, THE
GUILTY MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 35-118 (1955); Hall, Psychiatry and
Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761 (1956); Rome, McNaughten, Durham and
Psychiatry, 34 F.R.D. 93, 95-105 (1964).
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generally agreed that insanity in the legal sense connotes the absence
of a guilty mind and that the aims of punishment, especially deterrence
and retribution, are not effected by imposing sanctions on insane per-
sons., In determining whether a person was legally insane at the time
of the criminal act, the concept of mental disease has been an important
element since the M'Naghten rules7 were formulated by the House of
Lords over a century ago.8 And two modem insanity tests-those of
Durham9 and the Model Penal Code' 0-require that the criminal act
be "the product of" or "result of" mental disease or defect, thus placing
even greater emphasis on mental disease than does M'Naghten."1
Insanity has been used historically to denote those persons whose
state has resulted from involuntary causes, and hence the analogy to
physical disease was a natural one.' 2 We think of insane persons as
6 Of course, any such summary must incur dangers of oversimplification, and this one
is no exception. Some of the various problems and issues are posed in GLUECK, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 5-19; HALL, GENERAL PIuNCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 477-538 (1947). A
general and perhaps more traditional approach is presented by Michael, Psychiatry and
the Criminal Law, 21 A.BA.J. 271 (1935).
7 "[]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that,
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such
a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what
was wrong." M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
8 See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Watson, A
Critique of the Legal Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 611,
618-22 (1958).
9 "[Ain accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect." Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir.
1954).
10 MODEL PENAL. CODE (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961):
Section 4.01 Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) [T]he terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
11 While the phrase "disease of the mind" appears in M'Naghten, it has been generally
considered that the test stresses the cognitive capacity of the defendant, particularly at
the time of the act. Strictly speaking, it is not a "product" test-one engendering difficult
problems of causality. See, e.g., Allen, The Rule of the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code, 45 MARQ. L. R v. 494, 497-99 (1962); Kuh, supra note 4, at 781-85, 795. Of course,
it has been noted that jurisdictions applying M'Naghten have tended to give wide latitude
to psychiatric testimony, in effect allowing investigation similar to that under Durham
or the Model Penal Code. See, e.g., RUBIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 7-10; Wertham,
Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 336 (1955).
1 These points are much more fully developed in the third section of this article.
They are presented here only to provide a logical perspective so that the importance of
the term "mental disease" and its relation to criminal law may be appreciated. Certainly
all commentators are not in agreement even as to these very general statements. How-
ever, they do appear to represent the majority view. See, e.g., ROCHE, op. cit. supra
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being afflicted (acted upon rather than acting)-as being "sick" through
no fault of their own-and thus we do not hold them criminally
responsible. It was perhaps inevitable under these circumstances that
the term "mental disease" should have come to acquire its present
importance in this area, but in several respects this development was
unfortunate. The term was developed in the context of legal tests of
criminal responsibility, but no legal definition evolved. Rather, since
the courts and legislators were well aware of the analogy to physical
disease, it was and has been generally assumed that "mental disease"
is a medical term,13 more particularly a term within the special purview
of those medical men charged with behavioral abnormalities-the psy-
chiatrists.
Turning to the psychiatric literature to explore this general thesis
reveals, however, that there is no authoritative or generally accepted
medical definition of mental disease. Indeed, the single most impressive
fact is a negative one: the phrase "mental disease" is notable by its
absence in most of the vast theoretical, textbook, clinical, and dic-
tionary literature.14 When the problem of defining mental disease
is raised explicitly, it is resolved by psychiatric authorities in substan-
tially the following very different ways: (1) There is no such medical
entity as mental disease, or we would do well not to use the phrase.15
note 4, at 14-29; Swartz, supra note 4, at 398; Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics and the Criminal
Law, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 183 (1958).
13 See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("Mental ill-
nesses... are the subject matter of medical science."); Weihofen, The Definition of Mental
Illness, 21 Onxo ST. L.J. 1 (1960) ("Mental illness is a medical concept, and so it would
seem self-evident that its definition should come from the medical profession and not from
either legislators or judges.").
14 See generally Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 859-62 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger,
J., concurring).
A classic and often cited example of psychiatric problems with and manipulations of
this phrase is the week-end change in nomenclature at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in
Washington, D.C. A staff psychiatrist revealed to the court that between the court
sessions on Friday and Monday morning, the hospital officially decided that sociopathic
or psychopathic personality disorder was henceforth a mental disease, thus changing the
psychiatrists' testimony in the pending case involving such a disorder. See In re Rosenfield,
157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1957), described in Blocker, supra at 860 (Burger, J., concurring).
It is important to exclude a possibly serious misunderstanding. Certain current lines
of argument purport to establish that mental illness is a myth. See, e.g., SZASZ, THE MYM
OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961). These arguments call for a radical reinterpretation of
psychiatric theory and of the whole range of abnormal conduct. Such a wholesale thesis
is not at issue in the present discussion. The important theoretical problems concerning
the foundations of psychiatry and psychology are not directly relevant to the present
discussion because the thrust of our analysis is to free the legal tests of insanity from
psychiatric controversy.
15 ComI rriEE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AssocIA-
TION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL DISORDERS (1952), which used the
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(2) Mental disease is psychosis but not neurosis. 16 (3) Mental disease is
any significant and substantial mental disturbance, or is any condition
at all which is authoritatively dealt with by the psychiatrist or physician
treating mental conditions. 17 (4) Mental disease means substantial social
maladaptation or incompetence or both as judged by legal criteria.' 8
(5) Mental disease is the failure to realize one's nature, capacities, or
true self.'9
A review of the literature in psychology reveals similar results-there
is neither a clear definition of mental disease nor agreement on how
best to approach such a definition.20
Turning briefly to the legal literature on the question, we again find
inconsistency and no help toward providing an appropriate medical
definition of mental disease.21 In the course of its ground-breaking
phrase "mental disease" in early editions, has explicitly dropped it. "Mental disorder,"
used as a label for a wide range of conditions which include psychoses, psychoneuroses,
and mild personality disorders, is undefined other than by the statement that it is used
"generically to designate a group of related psychiatric syndromes," for the purpose of
distinguishing the simpler classified conditions from the more complex. "Mental de-
ficiency" is dismissed broadly on the grounds that it is "a legal term, comparable to the
term insanity, [which] has little meaning in clinical psychiatry." Id. at 10. See also
HINstE & CAMPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 602 (1960) (entry under "psychosis": "It is
not considered in keeping with available facts to refer to psychosis as a disease . . .');
Frohlich, Classification of Mental Disorders, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL HEALTH 1032
(Deutsch ed. 1963).
16 For testimony of psychiatrists to this effect in the courts, see Lyles v. United States,
254 F.2d 725, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1957); DONNELLY, GOLDSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAw 758,
769 (1962) (quoting from Record, pp. 225, 380-81, Durham v. United States, 237 F.2d
760 (D.C. Cir. 1956)). See generally Ov.RHOLsFR, THm PsYCHIATRIST AND TtE LAw 26-35
(1953); Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 650 (1958).
17 See, e.g., psychiatrists' reports and testimony in United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d
751, 754-56, 762 (3d Cir. 1961). See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, A PSYCHIATRIC
GLOSSARY 47 (2d ed. 1964) ("mental disease" in effect serves as a pragmatic label for a mis-
cellaneous totality of classified conditions at any time, rather than for some specific kind
of condition defined with reference to some system of concepts); ENGLISH & ENGLISH, A
COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOANALYTICAL TERMS 317 (1958)
("disabling disorder" includes psychosis and neurosis-but turns on social maladjust-
ment); Alexander, Fundamental Concepts, Basic Principles and Assumptions of the Psycho-
dynamic Position on Mental Disease, in INTEGRATING APPROACHES -ro MENTAL DISEASE 138
(Kruse ed. 1957).
18 See, e.g., ENGLISH & ENGLISH, op. cit. supra note 17, at 317; GRouP FOR THE ADVANCE-
MENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT #26, 8 (1954); Frohlich, supra note 15, at 1038-39.
19 See, e.g., Goldstein, The Organismic Approach, in 2 ARIErI, AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 1333, 1334-35 (1959); Jahoda, Mental Health, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL
HEALTH 1067 (Deutsch ed. 1963).
20 See generally Scott, Research Definitions of Mental Health and Mental Illness, 55
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 29 (1958).
21 See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 310 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v.
Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 771-73 (3d Cir. 1961); Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 859-63
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comments on this question, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
has concluded both that mental disease is a medical concept22 and that
as such it is not restricted to the psychoses. 23 On the other hand, the
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment flatly states that the phrase
should explicitly exclude the neuroses and certain other disorders and
thus be broadly the equivalent of psychoses.24 Pennsylvania, a state
whose legislation in this area reflects much recent professional thought,
defines mental disease in terms of social maladjustment and legal incom-
petence.2 5
In summary, while the presence of the "mental disease" element in
the criminal law insanity tests would seem to presume the existence of
an objective definition, and especially a medical definition, none seems
to exist. This is true not only in psychiatry, but also in the nonmedical
area of psychology. Thus, despite a series of tacit assumptions that
mental disease is a medical concept, the law does not supply any
answers and, in granting to psychiatrists broad authority in the guilt-
finding process, has tended to defer the responsibility for any definition
to the particular psychiatrists in the particular case.
Nevertheless, a definition is important where so central a concept
is involved, and one may well wonder whether there may be some ob-
jectively identifiable medical condition which ought reasonably to
be classified as mental disease on the basis of accepted medical doctrine.
It remains possible that the data and the generally accepted doctrine
logically allow such a classification even though no one has yet managed
to set out the concept in such a manner as to gain general acceptance.
To attempt this requires a more analytical and critical approach to the
(D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring). A general analysis of problems under military
law, where "mental disease, defect or derangement" are distinguished from "mere defect
of character, will power, or behavior," with particular criticism of Durham, is presented
in United States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 320-30 (1954). For general surveys of prob-
lems the District of Columbia courts have had under the Durham "mental disease" re-
quirement, see Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity
Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 921-29 (1961); Rome, supra note 5,
at 106-07. See also Fox, supra note 1, at 666-67.
22 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
23 Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d 640, 641 n.2, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("The assump-
tion that psychosis is a legally sufficient mental disease and that other illnesses are not
is erroneous.'). See also United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961) (sociopathic
or psychopathic personality not excluded from "mental illness" as matter of law). In
Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), Judge Bazelon, dissenting, asserted:
"Whether psychopathy, generally or of a particular type, constitutes a mental illness is
properly the subject of expert opinion." Id. at 735.
24 The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, op. cit. supra note 2, at 131.
25 Pennsylvania Mental Health Act of 1951, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1072(11) (1954).
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problem than can be provided by any mere inventory of dictionaries
and authoritative texts.
II. A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF MENTAL DISASE
The absence of a generally accepted and authoritative definition of
mental disease is not an accidental embarrassment of the historical
moment but a reflection of the fact that there are no fundamental
grounds in medical doctrine for justifying a definition of the term.26
Suppose we were to try to discriminate from among all classified
mental conditions or disorders those which ought to be set apart as a
medically significant group aptly specified as "mental disease." Given
the many specific diagnostic categories, what criteria would help to de-
cide which ones in particular are to be classified under mental disease
and which not? Or, to put the question in other words, for what pur-
poses would a psychiatrist have to be able to classify a person as having
a mental disease or not? The problem is not merely the verbal one of
deciding what conditions to term "mental disease." The problem is to
find a decisive medical reason for making the decision in one way rather
than another.
Let us put the problem more concretely. Suppose, for example, we
were to follow the line taken by some of those cited earlier and propose
labelling the psychoses and only the psychoses as mental disease. We
must ask: What medical reason is there for excluding, for example, the
psychoneuroses? To say that the psychoses involve a "break with reality"
in a way that the psychoneuroses do not is to present an important psy-
chiatric reason for classifying psychoses and psychoneuroses differently
-which is in fact done and is reflected in the use of just those two
words. But what additional reason is there for calling one "disease" and
26 The problem is not one of vagueness-a problem ubiquitous in the realms of psy-
chiatric nomenclature. Such a term as "schizophrenia" is distinctly vague, yet it names
certain recurring patterns of symptomatology' which are frequently phenomenologically
recognizable to the clinician as patterns. Given these patterns, certain typical develop-
ments are to be expected, and certain typical techniques are appropriate for handling
these developments. That differing diagnoses may be presented by different psychiatrists,
that things may not develop as predicted, that treatment may not produce expected
results-all of this is acknowledged. Yet, for better or for worse, the practice and theory
of psychiatry are formed in terms of this category, among others, and the clinician is at
times compelled to use it and to think in terms of it. Thus, vagueness or lack of under-
standing in connection with a notion does not necessarily exclude it from consideration
as a central notion. Although one cannot imagine current psychiatric discussion
proceeding without the use of the concept "schizophrenia," however vague the concept,
it is easy to imagine psychiatric discussion without use of the phrase "mental disease,"
and, as noted, this is usually the case.
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the other not? The same reason cannot be given, for the classification
"psychosis-psychoneurosis" already takes care of the "break with real-
ity" factor. A consideration of any other medically relevant factor will
be found to be expressible in medical terms other than mental
disease. In each case the further classification "mental disease" will
provide no additional medical information and thus be either empty
or redundant. Hence, the use of "mental disease" turns out to occur
in a meaningful way only in contexts where nonmedical issues such as
those of law, public welfare, social planning, or actuarial analysis are
crucial.27
Since it is difficult to establish the negative aspect of this proposition,
it will be helpful to attempt at this point an indirect analysis of the
notion "mental disease." We can most readily commence such an
analysis if we turn to an analogy. Then, after analysis of the analogue,
we can verify whether the analogue's suggestions concerning mental
disease are in fact warranted.
Let us compare the idea of mental disease to the idea of inade-
quate vision. At first, inadequate vision seems to be a medical con-
cept. Further reflection reveals, however, that although the oculist
can provide important and relevant information, he cannot justifiably
say, either in purely ophthalmological terms or even in general biologi-
cal terms, whether vision is adequate. For the oculist's purposes alone,
there is no need to define inadequate vision. All he needs to know
is to what degree and in what ways a person's vision deviates along a
standard scale from some base point on the scale. The oculist also
wishes to know about the bodily conditions and sometimes the en-
vironmental conditions which make it possible for the person to see
or not to see in specific ways. Finally, the oculist would like to know
what he can do to induce specific changes. Yet none of this, important as
it is, settles the question whether vision is adequate or inadequate.
The question whether vision shall be considered adequate depends
on the context and purpose of the use of that vision. Adequate vision
for a ditchdigger may not be adequate for a jeweler; and even a jew-
eler's vision may have such a specific defect as tunnel vision which
makes it inadequate for driving a vehicle. The medical condition of
the eyes in each case may be the same, but the social task varies. In-
adequate vision is thus in part an occupational concept. It is also a
concept rooted in public policy. For example, Jones may have adequate
vision to drive in a community which is willing to take great risks and
which has poor public transportation; whereas he may have inadequate
27 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 5, at 770, 773; Swartz, supra note 4, at 391-93.
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vision in a community where public transportation is excellent and
cheap and where public policy favors minimizing risk. In either case
the medical condition of Jones is the same.
Given these kinds of grounds for defining inadequate vision in
one way or another, the authority to establish the definition is in effect
the authority to resolve a policy question, not merely the ability to dis-
cover a matter of medical fact. The policy decision calls for an eval-
uation and synthesis, or at least a compromise, ranging over medical,
legal, occupational, and other issues. Neither the oculist nor the traffic
engineer alone is competent or authorized to decide the issue, although
both can present relevant expert testimony to be used in reaching such
a decision. The decision itself must derive from an authoritative inter-
pretation of public policy in the light of the technical information.
The definition is in this sense a governmental one, not a medical one.
We are now in a position to formulate more systematically certain
logical features of the adoption and use of such a concept.
The grounds for defining the phrase "adequate vision" are the facts
of medicine, the technical features of the activity or occupation, the
nature of any special context in which the activity occurs, and the rele-
vant public policies. The criteria or tests by which it will be determined
whether in fact a person's vision falls under the definition may be
purely medical, such as "20/40 vision minimal, after correction." The
grounds for adopting criteria will not wholly coincide with the grounds
for adopting the definition. Thus, in adopting criteria, the practica-
bility of administering certain tests will be relevant. The authority for
adopting a definition may lie with the legislature or with the governor
and may be exercised by establishing a basic motor vehicle code. The
authority for adopting criteria, on the other hand, may lie with some
person or agency other than the one authorized to adopt a definition,
such as the director of the state motor vehicle bureau, after consulta-
tion with expert advisors and in conformity with the basic motor
vehicle code.
These logical distinctions can help to clarify such questions as
whether "mental disease" refers to a medical fact or to subject mat-
ter for medical science. For example, when the Royal Commission
recommends that "mental disease" should be defined broadly to mean
psychosis,28 we are likely to suppose "mental disease" is a medical
term-if we focus our attention upon the terms of the definition. But
if we focus attention on the question of authority, we see that it is
28 The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, op. cit. supra note 2. But the Royal
Commission also offers a much more explicit definition. See note 48 infra.
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broadly speaking the lawmakers who have authority to establish a
definition. This suggests what is in fact the case: the grounds for
adopting the definition include (indeed are predominantly) matters
of public policy, law, and fundamental notions of morality. Since the
definition itself is formulated in terms of psychosis, a medical term,
it makes sense to adopt medical criteria, and the authority for adopting
medical criteria would naturally lie with medical men. If we focus our
attention upon the terms of the definition, upon those of the criteria,
and upon those persons with authority to adopt criteria (and inci-
dentally to apply them), our impression is powerfully reinforced that
this is a medical question with which we deal. Nevertheless, it is crucial
for our purposes to realize that the whole affair is initiated for legal
purposes, that the definition is authoritatively formulated by law-
makers, and that the fundamental grounds justifying the enterprise are
largely nonmedical.
There are many different nonmedical or not entirely medical con-
texts in which we may seize upon the phrase "mental disease" as a handy
device for accomplishing our purposes. For example, if we wish to with-
draw certain groups, such as addicts, homosexuals, and alcoholics, from
the punitive approach of the law, we may so use the phrase "mental
disease" as to include these groups among the mentally diseased. The
phrase may also be used to refer to those persons for whom public care
or treatment is thought desirable. Physicians, on the other hand, may
use the phrase to emphasize to the layman that a certain person needs or
might profit from psychiatric care. For actuarial purposes, the phrase
may be useful to single out groups which have a relatively high inci-
dence of occupational or other insurable disability without discoverable
organic basis. In all these cases, the language itself ("disease") and the
fact that the criteria are so largely formulated in medical terms give the
impression that this is a medical question per se. But in each case the
grounds for the definition (and often the criteria) and the authority for
adopting the definition are largely nonmedical. From this latter perspec-
tive, "mental disease" is not a medical term, but a moral, legal, or actu-
arial one. In each case the phrase "mental disease" is a term used to
introduce various nonmedical issues into a context where medical ex-
pertise is expected to be a "high-visibility" source of aid.
In the criminal law, in particular, the treatment of the problem of
mental disease has been confused by the failure of the courts to
distinguish between the grounds for introducing the phrase, the defini-
tion itself, the grounds for adopting criteria, the formulation of the
criteria, and the authority for adopting a certain definition or certain
criteria. The courts have failed to appreciate that while medical tes-
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timony often is relevant to the application of courtroom criteria of
mental disease, the grounds for the (tacit) definition, the grounds for
adopting the criteria, and the authority behind the whole are largely
legal and moral, not medical.
The District of Columbia cases which have followed Durham v.
United States29 and which have attempted to apply the "product of
mental disease or mental defect" requirement enunciated in that case
are particularly relevant in showing this confusion. In Durham the
court elaborated on its basic formulation only to the extent of dis-
tinguishing between "disease" and "defect" in that the former term
was used "in the sense of a condition which is considered capable of
either improving or deteriorating," whereas the latter was a nonchang-
ing condition "which may be either congenital, or the result of injury,
or the residual effect of a physical or mental disease."30 In effect, the
terminology employed in this definition is medical, but it is also quite
vague. If it were intended to provide any guidelines at all, even to
experts before the court, it certainly never achieved that purpose.31
In Carter v. United States,32 the appellant's conviction for first degree
murder was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. The court
found numerous errors in the trial court proceeding and discussed the
insanity test only for purposes of guidance in the second trial. The
court stated:
Mental "disease" means mental illness. Mental illnesses are
of many sorts and have many characteristics. They, like physi-
cal illnesses, are the subject matter of medical science.... The
problems of the law in these cases are whether a person who
has committed a specific criminal act-murder, assault, arson,
or what not-was suffering from a mental disease, that is, from
a medically recognized illness of the mind .... 3
While the court was careful to indicate that the testimony of psy-
chiatrists is only one form of evidence and that the ultimate deter-
minations and inferences are for the trier of fact, there is an underly-
ing assumption not only that medicine properly has authority, that
it can define mental disease, but also that it has in fact exercised this
authority. And implicit in these suppositions is a further presupposi-
tion: the court tacitly assumes that the grounds upon which a par-
29 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
30 Id. at 875. See generally Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U.
CHi. L. Rv. 367 (1955).
31 See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
32 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
33 Id. at 617. (Emphasis added.)
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ticular definition would be adopted are substantially medical grounds
-for if there were relevant and important nonmedical considerations
involved we should hardly expect the medical specialist alone to be
qualified to decide upon a definition.
Since the law insists on "mental disease" as a central term but gives
no clue as to its meaning except to say that it is a medical term, many
psychiatrists, desirous of cooperating responsibly with the law, have
felt compelled to decide the meaning of mental disease. Predictably,
the course of reaching such decisions has required the psychiatrists to
anticipate what the court will accept as a definition to excuse from
criminal responsibility. As a result, psychiatrists have made a prag-
matic judgment that the courts will not accept every disorder as a
disease 34 and a conscious attempt to utilize a psychiatric category which
they suppose will roughly serve-at least serve better than any other
single psychiatric category-to bring out the mental conditions relevant
to criminal responsibility. Thus, the general tendency of the psy-
chiatrists under both Durham and M'Naghten has been to equate
mental disease with psychoses. 35 Of course, in so doing the psychiatrist
is making a judgment about criminal responsibility-a judgment which
he explicitly is not authorized to make and with respect to which he
is of course not expert. 36 In effect, the courts have thus given the medical
men a blank check in matters of vital importance to the court.
In 1962, the District of Columbia Circuit, in McDonald v. United
States,37 reversed and remanded the appellant's lower court conviction
for manslaughter, apparently because the trial judge did not properly
instruct the jury on the meaning of the insanity defense.38 However,
the court also set out in its opinion a judicial definition of mental
disease 39 and thus seems to have appreciated that in some way its
34 See, e.g., DONNELLY, GOLDSTEIN & SCHvARTZ, op. cit. supra note 16, at 782 (quoting
from Record, Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957)).
35 See generally Hall, supra note 5, at 784-85; Reid, The Working of the New Hamp-
shire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity, 15 U. ML.mi L. Rv. 14 (1960). See also DONNELLY,
GOLDSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 16, at 758, 769 (quoting from Record, Durham
v. United States, 237 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1956)).
36 See RUBIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 81; Reid, supra note 35, at 15-16; Szasz, supra
note 12, at 189.
37 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
38 See discussion by Miller, J., dissenting and concurring. Id. at 852.
39 "prjhe court does take [in the majority opinion] two important, much needed and
long overdue steps: (a) it says, for the first time, what we mean by the term 'mental
disease or defect' in connection with criminal responsibility; (b) it rules quite clearly
that the jury is the sole and final judge of the credibility of all witnesses, including those
who testify as experts, and that it is to be so instructed. Heretofore, these two elements
have been sadly lacking in this court's opinions." Id. at 861.
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previous use of this term was not simply "the" medical use and that it
could not leave the issue of mental disease to the medical men.
40
Although the court referred to a "clinical" use, it asserted that "a
'mental disease or defect' for clinical purposes ... may or may not be
the same as mental disease or defect for the jury's purpose in deter-
mining criminal responsibility."41 At last, the focus is not on psychoses
or other broad psychiatric categories, 42 but on "mental disease," a
phrase recognized as requiring "a judicial definition, however broad
and general, of what is included in the terms 'disease' and 'defect.' 43
The definition proposed was relatively simple and concise:
[F]or the jury's purpose in determining criminal responsi-
bility . . . [it] should be told that a mental disease or defect
includes any abnormal condition of the mind which sub-
stantially affects mental or emotional processes and substanti-
ally impairs behavior controls. 44
This definition of mental disease reverts to the logical form of
the M'Naghten test of insanity; it telescopes into the one term, "mental
disease," the several variables, in their original logical relationships, of
the entire M'Naghten formula.45 In the McDonald definition and also
in M'Naghten, a general or underlying condition is first mentioned: in
McDonald it is "an abnormal condition of the mind," and in
M'Naghten it is "disease of the mind." In both cases this condition is
the source or cause of more specific mental debilities bearing on
criminal responsibility. In McDonald the abnormal mental condition
"substantially affects mental and emotional processes and substantially
impairs behavior controls," whereas in M'Naghten it is "from" disease
of the mind that there arises a "defect of reason" consisting in a failure
to know the nature of the act or its moral quality. In the expanded
40 In this connection, see subsequent explanations of McDonald in Gray v. United
States, 319 F.2d 725, 727-28 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Burger, J., concurring); Hawkins v. United
States, 310 F.2d 849, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
41 312 F.2d at 851. Perhaps the court even appreciated that there is no systematic
medical use, for it also referred to "ad hoc definitions or conclusions as to what experts
state is a disease or defect." Ibid.
42 See The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, op. cit. supra note 2. Cf. Carter
v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957), where the court, after generally stating
that mental disease is properly the subject matter of medical science, notes that "unex-
plained -medical labels-schizophrenia, paranoia, psychosis, neurosis, psychopathy-are not
enough. Description and explanation of the origin, development and manifestations of the
alleged disease are the chief functions of the expert witness."
43 312 F.2d at 850-51.
44 Id. at 851.
45 See note 7 supra.
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versions of the M'Naghten test allowed in some jurisdictions, a defect of
the will ("irresistible impulse") is an additional item which may
serve as the debility arising "from" disease of the mind. The main
difference between McDonald and M'Naghten is that in both of its
parts McDonald is in crucial respects more sweeping and more vague. It
is also fundamentally question begging in a way in which M'Naghten
is not.
Under the McDonald definition the trier of fact who finds the mental
and emotional processes "substantially impaired" must still ask:
"affected" and "impaired" in what way?46 The obvious answer is:
affected and impaired in a way which results from an "abnormal condi-
tion of the mind." But surely not just any abnormality of mind will
do for the present purpose. A person who is in a state of self-induced
alcoholic or narcotic intoxication is in an abnormal condition of the
mind which can often substantially affect intellectual and emotional
processes and impair behavior controls. Again, unavoidable or neg-
ligently induced extreme fatigue and exhaustion is associated with an
abnormal condition of mind which may substantially affect intellect
and emotion and impair behavior control. But surely these kinds of
abnormal conditions of the mind are not appropriate for the purpose of
excusing from criminal responsibility by reason of insanity.
What is clearly needed is a statement of that specific sort of mental
abnormality which will help to establish the insanity plea. What kind
of abnormal mental condition must the court have tacitly had in mind
when it formulated the definition? One possible answer is the specific
form of mental abnormality whose presence, appropriately connected
to the act, excuses from criminal responsibility. But this answer is
obviously defective on two grounds: (a) it makes the whole test a ques-
tion begging one since the mental disease test is supposed to provide
an independent criterion of the absence of criminal responsibility; (b)
it is still too general, for it is not difficult to think of mental abnormal-
ities whose presence, when appropriately connected to the act, typically
do excuse from criminal responsibility but which do not provide the
basis for an insanity plea. Such a condition would be produced, for
example, by nonnegligently induced exhaustion. Another possible
answer would restrict the insanity plea to those mental abnormalities
which exist in involuntarily induced disorders in order to exclude men-
tal abnormalities produced by exhaustion, intoxication, concussion, and
46 The problems of vagueness relating to use of the term "substantially" are omitted
here as irrelevant. For discussion of these problems in connection with the Model Penal
Code insanity test, see GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 22-23.
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the like. But this also renders the McDonald definition hopelessly ques-
tion begging. The point of using the phrase "abnormal condition of
the mind" was precisely to help define what the court meant by
,'mental disease."
Thus, the court in McDonald recognizes the inadequacy of treating
mental disease as a medical concept and proposes that since this
concept serves specific legal purposes it should be defined accordingly.47
However, the opinion fails to build on a constructive account of that
legal role and thereby offers a definition which compounds the present
confusion. 48
47 See, e.g., Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 859-62 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J.,
concurring). McDonald has not been universally acclaimed, however, at least not in the
context of the Durham rule. The criticism can be resolved into the basic observation
that the jury is concerned with blame and responsibility, that the whole posing of the
question in terms of disease is wrong. See generally RumN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 52-62.
48 There have been two other prominent legal attempts to provide a definition for
mental disease in recent years. The Pennsylvania Mental Health Act of 1951 provides:
"Mental illness" shall mean an illness which so lessens the capacity of a person
to use his customary self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his
affairs and social relations as to make it necessary or advisable for him to be
under care. The term shall include "insanity," "unsoundness of mind," "lunacy,"
"mental disease," "mental disorder," and all other types of mental cases, but the
term shall not include "mental deficiency," "epilepsy," "inebriety," or "senility,"
unless mental illness is superimposed. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1072(11) (1954).
Of course this definition is formulated for purposes of civil committability and is broader
than "legal insanity." See Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 27, 117 A.2d 96, 101
(1955). Pennsylvania, while adhering to M'Naghten for purposes of assessing criminal
responsibility, see Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 150 A.2d 102 (1959), has applied
the Mental Health Act definition in determining whether a convicted murderer should
be committed for care, noting that the standard as to mental capacity of a defendant to
stand trial or be sentenced differs from that as to responsibility ("legal insanity"). See
Commonwealth v. Moon, supra at 23, 117 A.2d at 99.
A second effort to define "mental disease" may be found in The Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment, op. cit. supra note 2, at 73: "By 'mental disease' or 'disease of
the mind,' we mean a pathological change arising de novo in the mind of an individual
who has already progressed some way towards maturity or has attained it. We recognize
that mental disease may occur in children, adolescents or adults, in persons of retarded
or of normal intelligence, and in persons of normal or of psychopathic temperament.
We conceive, however, that the implications of the word 'disease' are that a new element
of mental deterioration or disorganization is introduced, bringing with it a qualitative
departure from the previously established norm. For us, therefore, mental disease is only
one part of mental disorders of all kinds, and broadly corresponds to what are often
called major diseases of the mind, or psychoses; although it may also arise in cases
such as those of epilepsy or cerebral tumor, which are not ordinarily regarded by doctors
as psychotic."
It is to be noted, however, that this definition is largely cast in medical terms. Moreover,
by its attempted differentiation between major and minor diseases of the mind-psychoses
as opposed to psychopathic personality, neurasthenia, and so forth-the Commission indi-
cates that it is really not providing a systematically grounded definition of mental disease
at all, but only providing convenient terms for use by the forensic psychiatrist.
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III. THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE OF MENTAL DISEASE
Since M'Naghten the decisions of the English and American courts
as to criminal insanity have revolved around two key elements: (1) the
current, responsibility-impairing mental debility out of which came the
act,49 and (2) the source out of which came the mental debility--
"mental disease" in the tests in use since M'Naghten.50 The first of
these elements comprises the main part of the M'Naghten test-the
inability to know the nature or wrongness of the act-and can be traced
in the legal writings for centuries prior to M'Naghten.51 However, the
concept "disease of the mind" first emerges authoritatively in M'Nagh-
ten, although the search for an explanation as to the cause of the lack
of understanding of the insane person had also been pursued over
several centuries.5 2
By using "disease of the mind" M'Naghten accepts implicitly the
49 The notion of "current, responsibility-impairing mental debility" has been coined
to express the general concept appearing in all of the insanity tests (except Durham in
its pre-McDonald form) of an inability to know, to control, or to conform at the time
of the criminal act. In M'Naghten, for example, this condition is stated as a "defect of
reason ... as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." 10 Cl. & F. at 210, 8 Eng.
Rep. at 722. This current debility is characterized in terms of everyday moral psychology-
"reason," "know," "conform," "impulse," "appreciate," "defect," "incapacity." In each case
this debility is specific to the prohibited act, i.e., it "causes," "produces," or is a necessary
condition of the act's occurrence. In each case this debility is in turn designated as being
"from" or "the product of" mental disease. The mental debility is what has the immediate
morally vitiating effect upon the act, i.e., it establishes defect or peculiarity in the respon-
sibility status of the act. The source (mental disease) element is necessary to specify one
particular form of such defect in responsibility-insanity.
50 Durham originally dropped the current mental debility element as being unduly
limiting, causing criminal responsibility "to rest upon [one] particular symptom." 214
F.2d at 872. However, McDonald in effect reintroduced this element through its broad
definition of mental disease. See text accompanying note 45 supra. Thus, both elements
-current mental debility and mental disease-may be found in all the current insanity
tests.
51 See generally United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 763-65 (3d Cir. 1961); GLUECK,
MENTAL DIsORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 123-60 (1925).
52 The element of mental debility was used by Hale and Tracey, who agreed that
it consisted of not understanding or knowing what one was doing. The insane person
was considered a mental child. See generally Crotty, The History of Insanity as a De-
fense to Crime in English Criminal Law, 12 CALIF. L. REv. 105 (1924). However, the source
of this debility was variously framed in terms of the Aristotelian "humours" or of the
newer Lockean "faculty psychology" arising out of the scientific-materialistic upsurge in
the late seventeenth century. M'Naghten abandons "humours," but retains Lockean faculty
psychology in its use of "defect of reason." "Humours" are replaced by "disease of the
mind," reflecting the great eighteenth and nineteenth century upsurge in scientific interest
in anatomy and disease causation and prevention. The Benthamite concern for a rational
approach to social and bodily ills and the new emphasis on and reliability of diagnosis
as leading to cure are certainly relevant in this change. See generally SINGER & UNDERWOOD,
A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDICINE 208-36, 244-80 (1962).
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analogy between physical diseases, in which a number of cases could
be identified and treated rationally, and mental disease, where
nothing so specific was then possible. 53 "Disease" offers a serviceable
analogy for use in the context of criminal responsibility because it is
possible to view some criminal-like conduct as morally similar to the
symptom of a disease. The ordinary physical disease symptom is an
abnormality which is produced from within the person himself; it is
the result of something in the person, or of something about the
person's makeup which is at least for the time a part of him. Yet,
although it exists within the person and may be said to be produced
by him, it is produced involuntarily. Not only is the symptom
produced involuntarily, but the condition which produces it, the dis-
ease, is itself present independently of the person's will at the time. The
symptom of a physical disease is thus said to "happen" to the person-a
formulation with a profoundly important moral point bearing on the
issue of responsibility.5 4 The requirement that the current mental
debility of the person be "from" disease of the mind was thus a crucial
limiting condition. The mental debility element in the formula singles
out a specific, effective mental derangement which vitiates the im-
mediate moral or legal integrity of the act. The mental disease ele-
ment of the formula tells us something morally and legally relevant
about how this debility came about. The mental debility came about as
the result of something deeper from which the person suffers.55
In applying the insanity test, the trier of fact begins by asking
whether the prohibited act resulted from mental debility. If it is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that the act did not result from such
debility," the insanity plea is refuted. However, if this is not proven,
53M'Naghten is thus an explicit step in the direction of the scientific materialism
which was intellectually fashionable in the nineteenth century. At the time, the analogy
rested only on a hope--one in which the educated man supposed that a major portion of
mankind's troubles could be diagnosed under the heading "disease" and that it was in terms
of the new knowledge of the body, and of the brain, that these troubles would soon be
medically curable.
54 The older concepts of "humour" and "faculty psychology" were employed to reach
substantially the same interpretation and evaluation-that the current mental debility
leading to the act was produced from within the person, from something a part of him,
but independently of his will.
55 See, e.g., ROC:HE, THE CRIMINAL MIND 14-29 (1958).
56 There are certain requirements relating to the burden of proof and burden of
persuasion that are of course relevant to this determination. These may vary somewhat
as to insanity from one jurisdiction to the next, but may be generally stated as follows.
There is first an assumption that all persons are sane. The defense, by raising the issue
of insanity in a substantial manner (by "some evidence" in the District of Columbia,
Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d 640, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1957)), then imposes on the
prosecution the burden of proving this issue (sanity), as all others relating to the alleged
crime, beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Krash, supra note 21, at 934-37.
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the trier of fact next asks: Did this current mental debility have its
source in mental disease (or defect)?57
This latter question may be explicated in three alternative ways: (1)
Did the mental debility have as its source a condition or feature of the
person's own makeup, a condition suffered involuntarily? (2) Did the
mental debility have its source in a condition which, however or
wherever initially produced, at the time of the prohibited act had an
existence relatively independent of external causes, of foreign sub-
stances incorporated into the body, or of intentional acts or negligence
by the person himself? (3) Was the mental debility the specific effect,
relatively limited in time, of some particular external circumstance,
or external occurrence, or foreign substance incorporated into his body?
If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that (1) or (2) are answered
negatively, or that (3) is answered affirmatively, then the plea of
insanity is refuted. Otherwise, the defendant must be held not guilty
by reason of insanity.
As the court in McDonald v. United States58 stressed, the psychia-
trist's role in the criminal insanity trial becomes that of an expert
testifying to his observations in terms of symptoms, how these related
to the person's makeup, the possible mental state at the time of
the act in question, and how the mental state related to the act.59
Medical terms may be employed, but should be clearly explained to
the jury in terms of probable conduct or behavior of the person. The
expert would not be compelled to answer the question, "Did the
defendant have a mental disease?" The triers of fact would have to
answer the question: Did the defendant's act arise out of a (morally
vitiating) mental debility (as specified in the particular rule used by the
court), and was this debility rooted in the person's own makeup, not
merely as a local effect of something which has happened or been
57 Although the exact terminology which should be used to single out this issue is
debatable, "mental disease" would probably remain the best choice because of the weight
of precedent. Perhaps "disease" is too insistently medical in its overtones and suggests
too strongly a condition of limited duration. Perhaps "disorder" or "abnormality" would
better serve to deemphasize the narrower medical interpretation as well as the suggestion
of a limited duration. It would appear, however, that this is only a matter of detail in
the tactics of creating a legal language, and therefore "mental disease or defect" should
be retained.
58 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
59 There are obvious problems of causation here. Much of the criticism of Durham
originally grew out of the formulation of a "product" test. See, e.g., Reid, supra note 35,
at 30-31; Wechsler, supra note 30, at 369-72. The District of Columbia Circuit has dealt
with this problem specifically on a number of occasions since Durham. See, e.g., Camp-
bell v. United States, 307 F.2d 597, 601-02 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Carter v. United States, 252




done, but as something which was involuntarily a part of him? No
psychiatric label could settle the issue; no psychiatrist need feel ob-
ligated to offer an expert medical opinion on such a question, for it is
not a scientific question.6 0 In all its key concepts it is a moral-legal-
practical one. 1
The principal problem of a definition of mental disease along these
lines is that it inherently leaves a certain vagueness with respect to how
the condition which is the source of the mental debility is to be
identified from among all the other concurrent and contributing con-
ditions. Nor is it always clear how to determine when a condition exists
independently of local and limited causes and is instead suffered
involuntarily as a feature of the person's makeup. We do not have
and cannot have unambiguous or precise criteria for assigning causality,
nor can we have them for defining what is involuntary or what is part
of a person's makeup. For although the notions of a critical cause, of
the voluntary, and of what makes up the person are vital and necessary
notions of everyday moral psychology and of law, they are not precise
notions; they have a core of obvious meaning, and there is a wide
periphery where we must decide what to say in the particular case.
The existence of these problems, however, does not justify abandon-
ing the kind of definition of mental disease here proposed. The sorts of
questions I have posed express necessary elements of the very meaning
of the doctrine that a person may justly be held not guilty of a criminal
act by reason of insanity. Since that doctrine is not only well-rooted
in precedent but justly reflects an important social, moral, and legal
distinction, we must try to answer the questions it poses. The vagueness
inherent in the notion of mental disease, like the vagueness of reason-
able doubt, probable cause, ordinarily prudent man, and other such
notions, is a vagueness which genuinely belongs to certain crucial and
proper notions in law.
Furthermore, the attempts to avoid such problems have led to the
adoption of spuriously precise and spuriously unambiguous proposals.
The practical confusion that the "mental disease is a medical fact" ap-
proach, for example, has generated is well known; I have discussed
the theoretical confusion at length. The law would do well to avoid
60 It should be noted that one of the aims of the Durham test was to avoid asking the
psychiatrist questions demanding a yes or no answer, answers which from his background,
training, and investigation he could not properly supply. See, e.g., Carter v. United States,
252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness,
22 U. CHI. L. Ray. 325 (1955). Under the guise of mental disease, however, a similar
unanswerable question has continued to be posed.
61 Which is to say, it is a question relating to the everyday moral psychology con-
sidered within the reach of a juror's experience and knowledge.
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substituting the wrong question for the right one because the former
is more clear or is thought on its face to be so. The task of the law is
to accept the burden of deciding legitimate, albeit vague, questions.
The question of mental disease can be formulated with the authority
of law, on legal grounds, in the language of law and everyday moral
psychology, and with respect to a genuine and important class of cases in
criminal law.
